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Moderator:Professor Daniel Bodansky*
Panelists: Scott Carlson**
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks***
Mariam Nawabi****
Professor Bodansky: Thank you very much. I want to add my welcome for
what promises to be a really interesting day. This panel kicks off our
proceedings, and quite appropriately so in my opinion.
The English historian, E.P. Thompson, once described the rule of law as an
"unqualified human good."' It helps curb arbitrary government; it provides a
framework for predictability within which individuals can order their
activities. Thus, establishing the rule of law represents one of the central
challenges both in building the institutions of a democratic state and in
developing a market democracy.
Despite a great deal of effort over the last decade, we still have much to
learn about how to establish the rule of law. What are the key elements of the
rule of law? What are the social, cultural, and political preconditions
necessary for its establishment? How does one build the rule of law over time?
What is the role of the international community in that process? How can it
contribute most constructively? Finally, what are the particular challenges in
establishing the rule of law in the aftermath of an armed conflict?
We have a very distinguished panel this morning to help us think through
these issues. Our first speaker will be Scott Carlson. Mr. Carlson is currently
a Supreme Court Fellow assigned to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. He
received his undergraduate degree from the University of Alabama, his law
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degree from the University of Georgia, and his LL.M. degree in international
and comparative law from Georgetown University. He has worked extensively
on rule of law and democratization efforts at the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and at the American Bar Association, where he served
as Director of Central and Eastern Europe Programs and Judicial Reform. He
will speak generally about the rule of law, thereby providing a good introduc-
tion for the rest of the panel.
Our second speaker will be Professor Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks of the
University of Virginia School of Law. Professor Brooks received her
undergraduate degree from Harvard, her masters degree from Oxford, and her
law degree from Yale. She served at the U.S. Department of State as a Senior
Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor. She also served as Acting Director of Yale's Orville H. Schell, Jr.
Center for International Human Rights Law and was a Fellow at the Carr
Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.
Her current work focuses on human rights, post-conflict rule of law issues, and
the law of armed conflict. She will focus her remarks on the issue of
establishing the rule of law in Iraq.
Our final speaker is Mariam Nawabi, who serves as Commercial and Trade
Counselor at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. She received
her undergraduate degree from George Mason University and her law degree
from Georgetown. She has worked for more than ten years on humanitarian
issues relating to Afghanistan and, in 2002, served on the UN Legal Affairs
Working Group for Afghanistan. Her work has focused in particular on
women's rights as well as commercial and legal reform issues. Her current
portfolio at the Afghan embassy includes reconstruction efforts affecting trade
and commerce in Afghanistan, private sector development, entrepreneurship
development for Afghan women, and commercial law reform. She will focus
her remarks on problems relating to Afghanistan in particular.
With that introduction, let me turn first to Scott Carlson.
Scott Carlson: Thank you. I would also like to thank the organizers for all the
hard work-that went into putting this together. It is also great to be back here
at my alma mater. Athens has changed and it has stayed the same, but it is
good to be back in any case.
I will cover some strategic considerations and approaches which I think are
of a general nature. These considerations are ones that I have gleaned from my
own experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere. I do not offer these
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considerations as an exclusive list, but rather one that should be provocative
and illustrative.
The first thing I think everyone has to keep in mind is that when you come
into a post-conflict situation there are some common conditions that you
encounter. The first is physical damage; it can be very extensive. Public
buildings may have been destroyed or looted. Legal records and materials
could be damaged or missing. The population will be fragmented and
embittered, typically. There may be entire segments that have been displaced.
There may be a wide variety of unresolved property disputes. Significant
unresolved human rights violations are very common. One or more factions
or ethnic groups may have actually participated in the violence of the conflict
and the local grievances may be very serious or even ongoing, or both.
Limited administrative capacity: Whatever the situation was before the
conflict started, you can rest assured that after the conflict, the administrative
capacity is going to be seriously compromised or potentially destroyed. Even
if substantial human capacity still remains, it may be filled with people who,
in some way, have been associated with the conflict before. It may also not be
representative of the population. Disaffected groups may need to be integrated
into the human administration. Rectifying all of these things will take time and
training.
As recent news events have shown, civil unrest and disorder may be
present. Residual fighting could go on long after the major part of the conflict
has stopped and opportunistic criminal activities are very common. All of
these things are made much more difficult to handle by the fact that, typically,
you do not have established traditions of democracy and respect for human
rights.
Against this backdrop, I like to do a self-check and a reminder-what I call
"The Three Rs of Post Conflict." In short, the three Rs are respect, redress,
and realism.
Respect: In terms of respect, I think it is important when you arrive to
realize that there was already some type of legal system in place. There is a
tradition, a body ofjurisprudence. It might be common law, it might be civil
law, or it might be Islamic law. This tradition will shape local understanding.
As you try to relate with local legal professionals, and have them relate
amongst themselves, this has to be kept in mind.
Redress: There may be widespread human rights abuses. There may be
systemic inequities that have been a part of the fabric of that country or zone.
Reflexive resuscitation of any of the old institutions may be viewed as ignoring
the need to address redress.
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Realism: As anyone knows, when you start thinking about limited local
capacity, physical damage, and things of that nature, you cannot expect for
things to recover immediately. What I suggest is that it is important to think
about these things in conceptual terms and not in terms of concrete timelines.
What are the objectives that you want to come up with and succeed at? From
that, come up with realistic expectations about timing.
None of these things is necessarily earthshaking or something that you
would not think of from examining common post-conflict conditions.
However, I think if you go into a post-conflict situation and you are working
on this type of thing, it is easy to get lost in a post-conflict "fog." It is
important from time to time to come back to the Three Rs and to reflect on the
reconstruction process.
With that context in mind, I would like to explore what I think are some
"lessons learned," or perhaps we should say "identified." A colleague at the
National War College recently admonished me to stop using the term "lessons
learned," because there is real doubt as to whether we are learning these
lessons. So perhaps it is more appropriate to just say "identified." There are
three basic categories I want to tackle: applicable law, judicial infrastructure,
and accountability for human rights violations.
In terms of applicable law, what I am concerned with is the law that should
apply in the post-conflict environment. Suppose you have an Australian
soldier who is conducting a police operation in East Timor. What law should
govern his actions? In terms of judicial infrastructure, ask what courts are
needed and who should staff them. If a NATO soldier in Kosovo captures a
thief, where should that trial be? Who should conduct that trial? Finally,
consider accountability for human rights violations. The basic question you
are looking to answer is: Who did what to whom? Once you are able to
establish a record that begins to answer this fundamental question, then you
have to determine what you will do with that information.
Taking a closer look at applicable law, I think three basic topics arise
immediately: the local legal context, the international context, and the question
of interim legislation.
With local legal context, if we are to respect it, we need to at least
understand it. That means that there needs to be an intent to look into the local
jurisprudence. However, if we are also going to take redress seriously, we
have to realize that perhaps some of the existing laws,jurisprudence, and legal
practices may have been used to oppress another group. If that is the case,
respect for local tradition may have to give way to concerns about redress.
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In the international context, if we have forces that show up, they will be
trained, most likely, in the laws of war and international humanitarian law.
But they may also have multiple codes of military conduct. This may create
a complicated situation in certain border areas. Hopefully, the military and
civilian contingents will have a decent understanding of basic international
human rights law. In most cases you see the UN and others talking about the
applicability of international human rights standards. At a minimum, I think
this should be understood to implicate things like the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,
In addition, once the civil situation has stabilized to some degree, whatever
interim authority you have will need to be able to begin issuing some sort of
interim legislation. This legislation will be necessary to establish some sort of
representative government, to put together a legal framework to correct past
injustices and inequities, and to conduct the basic business of government.
With that substantial task, it is safe to assume that you are going to need
some sort of legislative-administrative structure. The first task of this
legislative-administrative structure should be to catalogue existing legislation.
All of that law that I was just talking about needs to be brought into some sort
of thorough and coherent framework so that it can be distributed and
understood. Also, in the case of local law, there may be a need for reconcilia-
tion with international human rights standards. If we are to avoid falling into
the trap of resuscitating some sort of institution or legal tradition that has
oppressed one group, careful scrutiny is necessary. Local legal capacity to
engage in this exercise could be very limited. It is very common to find a need
for substantial international assistance in this reconciliation process.
As this is going on, there need to be mechanisms for representative public
participation. You have a population that you hope to see proceed towards
democracy and respect for human rights. The first thing you need to
demonstrate to this population is that they have a stake in the legal system. I
think one of the best ways to educate and to generate ownership in the rule of
law is to encourage some form of public participation in the lawmaking
process.
Once the necessary laws are collected and generated, you have to make sure
your system is capable of getting them to all parts of the country or zone, and
of making sure they are in the appropriate language. Frequently, you are in a
multilingual environment where one part of the country speaks one language
and another part speaks a totally different language.
Once you have the laws, you have to worry about applying them. That, of
course, means building judicial infrastructure and providing personnel. If the
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physical facilities are in good order, you may be able to move straight to
human resource questions. However, it is very unlikely that you will find the
physical facilities in good order. Even if the outside of a building appears to
be in good order, that may not be the case for the inside. An assessment of the
physical facilities should consider everything from electricity to security.
Next, you need to examine the human resource components that were
previously in place, so as to determine future needs. Frequently, prior staffing
models will not have been based on rational job descriptions or tasks. Also,
they may have had nepotistic components in terms of appointment and
promotion.
There may also be lustration concerns. "Lustration" is a term from the
Eastern European context; it generally refers to official, systematic attempts
to remove previous perpetrators.2 If a local judge has been viewed as an
oppressor, there needs to be some mechanism whereby files are reviewed and
the individual is made to account for past behaviors. If the physical situation
and the human resource situation are fragmented, it may be impossible to
easily generate local trust. This situation may call for a more extensive role for
internationals. The internationals may have to act as judges and prosecutors.
All of these components imply some sort of administrative structure. When
you begin to think about piecing together a staffing situation, it is important to
start thinking about how you will proceed. For example, what will be the
appointments process and the disciplinary process? As I mentioned, there may
be distrust of people who have sat in the judiciary before. The local popula-
tion needs to be reassured that this new system will address their concerns.
With respect to the new judges, there needs to be some demonstration that
they are appointed based on merit and character, particularly if the population
has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the new judiciary. Further,
because there may be a number of changes in existing legislation as well as
new legislation, there may be a need for substantial judicial training. The
judicial training program should be developed simultaneously with the
development of any new legislation so that as soon as the new legislation
comes into force, the judiciary is trained to use that legislation.
Budgeting: Once you have the physical facilities issue taken care of, the
staffing issue taken care of, and the training issue taken care of, you have to
make sure you have a system whereby you can pay people. The quickest way
2 See generally KIERAN WILLIAMS ET AL., EXPLAINING LUsTRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 3
(Sussex European Institute, Working Paper No. 62, 2003), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/
pdfs/wp62.pdf.
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to undermine the credibility of the judiciary is to have payment problems. It
increases the incentive for judges to take bribes and results in what we would
all expect--erratic service delivery. If people are to have confidence in the
rule of law, the system needs to be seen as consistent and reliable.
Judicial record-keeping: The records may have been destroyed or damaged,
or the types of records that may have been kept before may not be sufficient
for a democratic system that respects human rights. Attention should be paid
to the development of a centralized record-keeping system so that all courts
can exchange files and use them in a coherent fashion.
If the decision has been made to include internationals in some capacity,
whether as judges or prosecutors, there has to be clarity as to the jurisdictional
lines. Blurred jurisdictional lines could be viewed as a device for manipulating
the system for improper ends. If that happens, the notion of the rule of law,
which you are there trying to promote, could be further undermined.
One of hardest questions is how to address accountability for human rights
violations. There are four major preliminary concerns that have to be thought
about and addressed. The first is the protection and collection of information.
As soon as it is realistic, there needs to be a serious, coherent effort to collect
evidence and witness statements. Failure to protect this evidence early on can
jeopardize the success of any subsequent prosecution or any other type of
accountability mechanism. Once the information is collected, there needs to
be a substantial amount of resources devoted to its analysis. Individual cases
can be examined and anecdotal case files put together, but if the quantity and
quality of the information is sufficiently large, an entire other possibility
emerges.
I have a screen shot of the database that we used in a situation in Kosovo
which actually resulted in expert witness testimony in the Milosevic trial. The
idea was to take multiple witness statements, examine them statistically, and
do what I like to call "conflict mapping" to see if there are larger trends that
may be useful in proving or disproving aspects of a human rights case.
Once you have this information and you have analyzed it, you need to select
what type of accountability mechanisms you want to use. We are all familiar
with the Hague tribunal;judicial prosecution is certainly one very credible and
increasingly utilized avenue. Truth commissions are equally valid, or you may
use a combination of the two. Once you have these steps completed, you need
to think about implementation. Coordination among the potential actors
becomes very important.
The administrative structure and accountability is very different than the
other two situations I described. Because you have multiple players, it is hard
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to have any sort of centralized command structure. It is important to
emphasize local ownership because the success or failure of any accountability
mechanism will be dependent, in part, on local understanding and acceptance
of the process. This probably presupposes some sort of public outreach
process and, where realistic, public participation. It also means you are going
to deal with the key players: the NGOs and civil society actors who have
collected the information and done the reports, and the police in civil
administration who are actually protecting the evidence and doing some of the
follow-up investigation. When you talk to the victims, their friends, and their
family, you have to realize that you are going to bring some of these painful
situations back to the surface. You have to be prepared to deal with that by
using counseling and other social services.
Although all of these actors have their own bosses and their own structures,
it is important to try to do something in terms of coordination and implemen-
tation-some sort of regular meeting and exchange of information at the very
least. As these different groups begin to complete their components of the
accountability process, it is crucial that there be some sort of broad-based
publication and public information campaign. For accountability mechanisms
to be respected and thought of as successful and as encouragingreconciliation,
people have to know the results they can bring.
Thank you. I know this was a lot of information, but I wanted to lay out the
general considerations. I will close by reiterating that this was not meant to be
an exhaustive list; it was meant to be an illustrative one. I am looking forward
to hearing the comments of my colleagues and the discussion to follow.
Professor Bodansky: Thank you very much, Scott. Our next speaker is
Professor Rosa Brooks.
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks: Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here and
I am grateful to the Georgia Journal ofinternational and Comparative Law for
inviting me. It is particularly nice to see several people I have worked with in
the past, such as Scott Carlson. I had the pleasure of working with Scott on
legal issues in Kosovo while I was at the State Department and Scott was at the
American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative. It is
also a pleasure to see Captain Travis Hall, who will be today's lunchtime
speaker, sitting in the audience. I last saw Captain Hall in a very hot
courtroom in Baghdad last August.
In my remarks today, I am going to pick up where Scott left off. Scott laid
out some of the basic practical issues that arise when it comes to rebuilding the
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rule of law in any post-conflict society. I am going to speak today about some
of the particular challenges associated with building the rule of law in Iraq.
Let me start with a couple of general observations. Scott pointed out how
many complicated things there are to think about when you are talking about
the rule of law,3 which is a hard concept to get a handle on anyway. Most of
us think that the rule of law is one of those "I know it when I see it" concepts,
but we would be hard pressed to actually define "the rule of law." Following
on Scott's comments, it may not surprise you if I suggest that when it comes
to building the rule of law-whatever that is-in post-conflict settings, we are
not all that good at it. When I say "we" here, you can take that to mean "we
the international community," to a significant extent, and even more, "we the
United States," since the United States has unfortunately been the sole
architect of recent efforts to build the rule of law in Iraq.
As Scott said, maybe it is inadequate, or inaccurate, to offer "lessons
learned"4 from previous U.S. and international efforts to promote the rule of
law, because although there are certainly plenty of lessons to be gleaned from
past experiences and past failures, we have not done a particularly good job of
truly learning any of those lessons, judging from our current practices. I want
to suggest some of the reasons for that.
My first point: Building the rule of law is hard because it is hard. So it
should come as no surprise that we are not very good at it. As Scott has
suggested, there are a lot of interlocking pieces when we are talking about the
rule of law. Rebuilding the rule of law requires making sure that police,
judges, lawyers, and prison guards are all well-trained and adequately paid;
making sure that the physical infrastructure of courthouses, prisons, and so on
is adequate; rewriting legal codes; ensuring that the populace has accurate
information about the changes; and so on, to name only a few of the compo-
nents that go into creating that elusive state of affairs we call "the rule of law."
Trying to make all of these moving parts work together in the right way in the
wake of a violent conflict is exceptionally difficult even in the best of
circumstances. And in the real world, we are usually not operating in the best
of circumstances. In the real world, there are too few resources, coordination
is a problem, people make mistakes, and everything ends up taking longer and
being more complicated than you expected. So if we have not been all that
successful in building the rule of law in post-conflict settings, it is partly
because such a complex enterprise is inherently difficult.
' See infra pp. 120-26.
4 See infra p. 122.
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Building the rule of law in post-conflict settings is also hard because you
cannot rebuild the rule of law in a vacuum. You can have the world's most
wonderful judicial system, but if most people do not have enough to eat it is
not going to do them a lot of good and it is not going to do much to enhance
public trust in government structures or the international community. You can
have a fabulous set of legal codes, but if people are afraid to go out for fear of
being kidnapped, attacked, or blown up by a car bomb, it is not going to do
them a whole lot of good. I could go on, but I think that one of the biggest
challenges is that the institutions of the rule of law have to be rebuilt at the
very same time that security has to be reestablished. Reestablishing security
in turn involves both protecting people from physical violence and also
ensuring human security in the very broadest sense: ensuring that there is
electricity, adequate and safe drinking water, and enough food, medicine, and
shelter. This too is something that is exceptionally hard to do, even in the most
favorable circumstances, with the best planning, and with maximum goodwill
from the affected population.
It is particularly hard to build the rule of law in places like Iraq in the wake
of military intervention. That is because of the complex paradoxes that are
created by trying to rebuild the rule of law when you-"you" the United
States; "you" the international community-are there by virtue of having
relatively higher military capacities than anybody else, by virtue of having the
biggest gun on the block.
To illustrate this point, let me offer a couple of contrasting anecdotes from
my trip to Iraq last August. Almost a year has passed since then, and during
that year some things have gotten better and some things have gotten much
worse. Nonetheless, I think these short stories will give you some sense of
how these difficulties and paradoxes actually play out on the ground.
I was in Iraq last August partly to do research for a book on post-conflict
rule of law issues and partly as a consultant for a U.S.-based foundation that
was considering making grants in Iraq to help fund various transitional justice
and human rights-related mechanisms. Along with several colleagues, I visited
various police stations, courts, NGOs, and government offices, and met with
both Iraqi and Coalition officials to talk about the process of rebuilding the
rule of law.
On our first day, we dropped in unannounced at an Iraqi police station in
the middle of Baghdad. It was run like most of the other police stations in
Baghdad at that point in time: by American military police, who were working
to help train their Iraqi counterparts and rebuild the Iraqi police force. But in
[Vol. 33:119
THE RULE OF LAW
the interim, American MPs were essentially exercising effective control over
the operations of each police station.
Our first encounter with an American military policeman on the ground was
not an inspiring one. When we dropped in on this first police station, the
officer in charge was a young lieutenant from the Midwest. He could not quite
figure out what we were doing there. This was Baghdad, right after travel
restrictions for civilians were lifted, so at that time there were not a lot of non-
military personnel wandering around. The temperature was also about a
hundred and thirty degrees, not really conducive to touring the city. Having
a bunch of American law professors suddenly show up unannounced at this
police station was just mind-boggling for him. He kept saying, "What are you
doing here? Why do you want to be here?"
We were having a little trouble answering those questions ourselves-it
was our first day in Baghdad. The whole police station, of course, had no air
conditioning or electricity because sabotage and looting meant that the
electrical grid for Baghdad could not provide adequate electricity for most of
the city. So the lieutenant, and all of the other American soldiers, mostly
eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds, were just sitting there sweltering,
as were all the Iraqi policemen. We were dripping with sweat ourselves and
trying to formulate coherent sentences, which was not easy under the
circumstances. We managed to get out something like, "Well, we're interested
in the rule of law."
The young lieutenant's response to this was to look at us as though we were
completely cracked. He said, "There's no rule of law here. There's no law
here." Despite the presence of our Iraqi interpreter and various Iraqi police,
he went on to say angrily, "These Iraqis are all corrupt. They don't know what
they're doing. They just beat suspects to get confessions out of them. They
take bribes. We have to tell them what to do. They don't understand anything
about law. There's never going to be law here in a million years. These
people just aren't ready for it. They don't understand it." Needless to say, this
was not a great example of winning the hearts and minds of the local
population and it was a troubling reminder that cultural sensitivity generally
is not the U.S. military's strong point.
This encounter at the police station was in stark contrast to our next stop,
another unannounced visit, this time to an Iraqi court. It was sweltering there
too-same lack of electricity-but we were met by a middle-aged Iraqi judge
who, despite the heat, was wearing a heavy, dark suit and a tie. He looked very
uncomfortable, but it was clear that maintaining professional standards was
important to him. Once again, we explained that we were researching efforts
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to build the rule of law in post-conflict societies. He responded by saying,
"Well, the first thing you need to understand, and that most Americans don't
understand, is that Iraq has a very ancient legal tradition."
We nodded, and he said, "Are you familiar with the Code of Hammurabi?"
We replied that we knew of the Code of Hammurabi, and he said, "Well, most
Americans have never even heard of it. Iraq has an ancient legal culture. We
don't need you to come here and tell us about what law is. We invented law.
This is the cradle of Western civilization. We are the people who figured law
out, thousands of years ago. But now your soldiers are coming in and telling
us what to do, and you're not respecting our legal traditions or legal process.
The first thing the Americans did after the war was to announce that they were
immune from Iraqi legal process. So, if an American commits a crime, they're
completely immune, there's nothing that we can do about it. The Americans
are unaccountable. How can this be the rule of law?"
The Iraqi judge had a long litany of complaints about American-led rule of
law programs. He said-and of course I am paraphrasing here-"We have all
sorts of day-to-day problems in the administration ofjustice. You say that you
want to respect our indigenous system. We are trying to get crime under
control. But suspects will be brought in by the Iraqi police, and we will order
that they be detained so that they can be tried and, half the time, some
American will come in and order that they be released again. And the other
half of the time, suspects are hauled in by somebody, including, maybe, the
Americans, and we have a preliminary hearing, and decide that they ought to
be released because there's not enough evidence against them. But then some
American comes in and says 'No, no, no. We're going to detain them.' And
off they go, taken to some military detention facility and we never see them
again. What kind of rule of law is this? This is not the rule of law. You say
you want the rule of law, but you seem to be setting an example of total
arbitrariness and inability to respect our local processes."
This Iraqi judge was just as skeptical about the idea of the rule of law in
Iraq as the young and undiplomatic American military police lieutenant,
although he came at the issues from the opposite perspective. Although he was
extraordinarily polite to us, given the circumstances, his attitude was clear:
How can the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq claim to care about the rule of law when
it maintains control-tenuous control-only through overwhelming force and
when its actions strike many Iraqis as inconsistent and arbitrary? To put it a
little differently, how can you pull the rule of law from the barrel of a gun?
The rule of law is an elusive state of affairs, although most people who
design and implement rule of law programs might be reluctant to acknowledge
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this. As I said a few minutes ago, the rule of law is one of those "I know it
when I see it" concepts. Few of us could define it, but most of us are pretty
sure we know what it is. Of course, if you are not satisfied with relying on
sheer instinct, you can read dozens of highly theoretical law journal articles
arguing over just what the rule of law is or is not. But whether we rely on
intuition or on carefully reasoned theory, most of us would probably agree that
the rule of law has both a procedural dimension and a substantive dimension,
and that the two are interconnected. That is, the rule of law has something to
do with procedural fairness, with neutral mechanisms for decision-making, and
with lack of governmental arbitrariness. Under the rule of law, laws are fairly
and democratically enacted, they are known in advance, and they apply equally
to everyone-not only to those with less power. The rule of law also has
something to do with the conviction that processes based on rules and reason
have to trump force; that rights are more important than sheer might. Saying
this, of course, implies the existence of some shared substantive conception of
rights.
This suggests an even deeper reason for why it is tough to create the rule
of law. You can do as much as you like to set up judicial institutions and
revise statutes, but the bottom line is that if one wants to achieve that magical
thing-the rule of law-one not only has to create fair, appropriate, and
reasonable laws and institutions, one also has to create a widely shared societal
commitment to using those laws and institutions. To put it a little differently,
the rule of law only works if people believe in it. People have to believe that
rule of law mechanisms-the courts and all the other institutions of
governance-are there for them, will work for them, and will be a viable
alternative to other means of resolving disputes and getting things done.
People have to have enough faith in legal institutions to make them willing to
eschew violence, to eschew self-help, and to refrain from turning to the local
warlord, militia leader, or extremist religious organization to solve their
problems.
Conversely, if most people do not believe in the efficacy and worth of legal
institutions, it will not do much good to create them, no matter how good they
look on paper. It is not like the movie FieldofDreams, where the refrain was,
"If you build it, they will come." When we are talking about legal institutions,
no one will necessarily come unless they are convinced that it makes some
sense for them to do so. To use a wildly overused phrase, creating the rule of
FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989). The actual quote is "If you build it, he will come."
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law is a matter of winning hearts and minds as much as a matter of creating
institutions.
In Iraq today, American-led efforts to create the rule of law keep bumping
up against a fundamental paradox. We govern Iraq-to the extent that we
govern Iraq-because we had the military muscle to invade it and defeat
Saddam's armies, even when many of our allies did not want us to invade Iraq.
As the world's sole superpower, we were able to do what we wanted and no
other nation could hope to stop us. We encountered a great deal of diplomatic
opposition, but we invaded Iraq anyway. Maybe that was the right thing to do
or maybe it was the wrong thing to do. Maybe it was a little bit right and a
little bit wrong, or right in principle but done at the wrong time or in the wrong
way. We could debate this eternally, but the bottom line here is that the United
States was powerful enough to go its own way-right or wrong-and we did
go our own way.
So our current adventures in Iraq began with a military invasion that was
perceived by many around the world-including most ordinary Iraqis-as
illegitimate, enabled by our superior military might rather than by international
law. Not an auspicious start to the project of convincing a defeated post-
conflict population to believe in law and in reason, rather than the efficacy of
coercion. It is hard to proclaim the virtues of rights over might when you have
just offered the world an object lesson in might makes right.
Since the end of the war in Iraq, the misunderstandings born of this paradox
have only proliferated. Iraqis-like the judge I mentioned earlier-often see
the actions of the Americans in the judicial arena as rather arbitrary and this
spells danger for the project of creating the rule of law in Iraq. Under Saddam
Hussein, Iraq's legal and judicial institutions were badly discredited because
they were naked instruments of his political power. But if U.S. efforts to
reform the Iraqi legal system appear arbitrary, many Iraqis may find it hard to
tell the difference between Saddam's rule of law and American rule of law.
Of course, we all think, "Well, there's a huge difference," because after all,
we are the good guys and we genuinely want fairness and reform, whereas
Saddam ruled for his own benefit, not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. And
of course I believe that there is a real and profound difference. But from the
perspective of a young Iraqi who is plucked off the street by American soldiers
and tossed into detention, maybe because he is hanging out with some bad
guys or maybe because he is just in the wrong place at the wrong time, it may
not seem that different on the ground.
It is tempting to conclude from what I have said that the problem is that the
Coalition is being a little too heavy handed with the Iraqis and that if we want
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to create the rule of law, we should first take a big step back. I do not think
that is the solution either. When you ask Coalition officials, "Why do you
sometimes release Iraqis who the Iraqi judges think should be detained, and
detain those who Iraqi judges order released?" you actually get a fairly
persuasive answer. Coalition officials will give a somewhat more diplomatic
version of the comments the young American lieutenant offered, saying
something like, "Because we've looked at the evidence and sometimes people
are being released or detained by the Iraqi judges on purely nepotistic grounds,
or as a result of bribes or intimidation, or because the evidence against them
was clearly trumped up, or they were beaten to get a confession. The Iraqi
judges may claim to be fair, but they are not. We may appear to be arbitrary
to onlookers who see only that we sometimes countermand what the Iraqi
judges say, but in fact, we are applying genuine rule of law standards, insisting
on due process and true fairness."
Much of the time, this is undoubtedly the case. It would be silly to deny
that there are deep problems with the Iraqi judicial system. Although Iraq has
many dedicated and honest police and judges, the political system under
Saddam Hussein also left a legacy of corruption and abusiveness. The
American willingness to settle disagreements by falling back on our superior
force undermines our claim to stand for the rule of law in many respects. But
the alternative would also undermine the rule of law. If we simply stood by,
wringing our hands in the face of evident abuses, we would not be doing
anybody a favor either.
This is the inherent paradox faced by those who wish to promote the rule
of law but are in a position to do so only by virtue of their possession of
superior force. Hobbes would have seen no contradiction here, but we
Americans owe more of our assumptions to Locke and his "kinder, gentler"
vision of the relationship between law, power, and legitimacy than to Hobbes'
grim realism.
Is there any way around the difficulties and paradoxes I have outlined so
far? I have said that building the rule of law in post-conflict societies is
difficult in general because there are so many moving parts. It is an unbeliev-
able coordination challenge, much harder than getting those rovers up to Mars,
because you are dealing with human beings and not machines. It is particularly
hard, as I have said, in the context of places like Iraq or Afghanistan, when the
international community is present by virtue mainly of superior force, which
is inherently somewhat contradictory to the idea of building the rule of law.
I do not think there is any simple solution. Nevertheless, I think that there are
lessons that could be learned, although, like Scott, I am skeptical about our
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collective capacity to learn them. Let me quickly suggest a few of these
lessons.
The first lesson is, or ought to be, obvious: Plan in advance for these kinds
of problems. For example, in the Iraqi context, lack of advance planning
hampered U.S. efforts from the beginning. As a result, we missed a window
of opportunity very early on after the war ended. By failing to anticipate
looting, sabotage, crime, and the exceptionally high level of human need we
faced in post-war Iraq, we missed our chance to create security, including
human security in the broadest sense, and as a result we sacrificed a critical
chance to win the trust of ordinary Iraqis.
A second lesson: Know the culture and the language well. During our visit
to Iraq, my colleagues and I were tremendously impressed when we ran into
Captain Hall and found him chatting away in Arabic to an Iraqi judge. It was
great to see an American JAG officer speaking fluent Arabic and working with
Iraqis as colleagues. Even our Iraqi interpreter was impressed. But when we
told Coalition authorities how impressed we had been by Captain Hall and
asked how many other JAG officers spoke Arabic, we were told sheepishly
that Captain Hall was pretty much the only one. This is a real tragedy. If we
hope to build trust and to work to promote the rule of law in post-conflict
societies, we desperately need more people like Captain Hall, people who are
capable of engaging in a respectful and appropriate way with local people, and
engaging with them on their terms, not just on our terms.
Third, if we want to create the rule of law, we need to lead by example.
That means that not only must we--our troops, our officials, and our
civilians-abide by the highest human rights standards, but we need to do so
visibly, in a way that is plain to all Iraqis and all the world. When there are
abuses committed by American officials or soldiers, we need to make sure that
the resulting investigations or disciplinary procedures are as public as possible.
If we want to maintain credibility, it is critical that we avoid even the
appearance of double standards. We need to show that despite our possession
of superior firepower, we are willing to comply ourselves by the very same set
of rules we want others to comply with.
Fourth, if we care about the rule of law, the United States needs to take a
more multilateral approach. This paradox that I have talked about-how to
bring the rule of law from the barrel of a gun-partly stems from the fact that
in Iraq, the face of the guy with the gun and the face of the guy urging the rule
of law are one and the same. With almost all the troops and civilians on the
ground operating under the auspices of the American military, most Iraqis
unsurprisingly find it difficult to distinguish between our claims about
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legitimate authority and rights and our sheer power. Making sure that both
soldiers and civilians come from nations all over the world would not entirely
solve this problem, but it would certainly help give rule of law efforts a bit
more credibility.
Finally, the last point: We need to be more open about acknowledging these
paradoxes, both to ourselves and to the affected populations in societies such
as Iraq. In effect, we need to be honest enough to say to the Iraqis, "Look, we
know it's hard to sell you on the value of the rule of law when we're the ones
with the guns, and the tanks, and the helicopters. We're going to tell you to do
some things that you may not want to do, and the bottom line is that you won't
have much choice about some of these things, because we won and you lost.
But we promise this won't be forever, and in a few years it's going to be
entirely up to you again."
Broadcasting this message would make a lot of people angry but I suspect
such an honest message might make people somewhat less angry than the
current state of affairs. Right now, Iraqis rightly decry what they perceive as
deep American hypocrisy: we have one group of soldiers out shooting at
people to make them behave the way we want and another group of soldiers
simultaneously standing around in Iraqi courts saying, "Come on, folks. Let's
all join hands and believe in reason, rights, and the rule of law."
We are trying to have it both ways and we cannot, so we might as well
admit the problem. There is no simple solution, but being straightforward
about the nature of the problem is the beginning of the way forward. Thank
you.
Mariam Nawabi: Other panelists have identified a lot of lessons learned. I will
cover the post-conflict situation and major differences in the Afghan
multilateral effort. In Afghanistan, you have not only the United States
involved, but a lot of European countries, Japan, Australia, and others.
Afghanistan does have its own sovereign government that is working in
conjunction with the international community. Also, the Afghan people, the
majority, welcomed the international involvement in the country because of the
past twenty-three years of conflict, because the people wanted to build peace
and to reconstruct the country, and because they know it cannot be done alone.
The Afghan government, right now, does not have the resources and capacity
to take on this huge task on its own.
One of my favorite quotes is, "The pen is mightier than the sword."
Moving Afghanistan away from the rule of the gun to the rule of law is crucial
to the development of the whole country. The Afghan government is
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committed to establishing the rule of law and in the past couple of years, since
the fall of the Taliban, has made significant progress in that area. But given
the devastation in Afghanistan over this twenty-three year period of conflict,
the legal system has just been devastated, both in terms of infrastructure and
human capital. There is the lack of resources to train the judicial personnel
that Scott was referring to. 6 There is a greater need for donor support and
coordination in the area ofjudicial reform because you do have more than one
country involved in the reconstruction efforts. Lastly, the lack of international
support to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), outside
of Kabul during this whole two-year period after the fall of the Taliban, has
made it a tremendous challenge to implement the rule of law outside of Kabul.
Democracy is not a new concept for Afghans. Actually, it is embedded in
the culture. There arejirgas; there is also the loyajirga, which is a gathering,
a convening, of people from around the country, similar to what we would
think of as a referendum process in the United States. Afghans have been
using thejirga process to resolve certain issues of national importance. There
are also shuras.7 At the local level these councils decide issues by consensus.
The cornerstone and foundation of democracy is there, but in order to develop
a democratic and moderate Islamic state in Afghanistan, it is going to take a
long-term commitment. Short-term plans will not work because of the
devastation that the country has experienced from the Soviet invasion, the civil
war, and then the Taliban.
Although there are still areas of conflict in the south, I define post-conflict
Afghanistan as post-Taliban Afghanistan. In order to understand post-conflict
Afghanistan, it is important to understand, as Scott said,8 what the legal system
was like before the Taliban. Afghanistan is unique in the region in that it
developed an indigenous legal system. It was never colonized by the British.
Thus, it borrowed from different countries based on its needs at the time. It is
largely a civil code country that developed its codes from the Ottoman Code.
It borrowed from the French, the Egyptians, as well as Afghan legal institu-
tions. The main codes that existed were a civil code, a commercial code, a
penal code, and a criminal procedure code.
In addition, even though it was a constitutional monarchy for most of the
last century, it did have a parliament that passed stand-alone legislation, so
there were statutes that existed. There was an independent judiciary, although
6 See infra pp. 123-24.
7id.
' See infra p. 121.
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the king exerted a lot of power and had veto power. Nonetheless, the judiciary
heard cases and interpreted legislation. There is also a history of
constitutionalism in Afghanistan, although unfortunately the country has seen
too many constitutions because of all the political changes that took place.
Afghanistan has seen, in the last century, an absolute monarchy, a
constitutional monarchy, a republic, communism, an Islamic republic during
the civil war, and a theocracy under the Taliban. The new challenge will be
to move Afghanistan into a democratic and moderate Islamic state. It is a
tremendous challenge. The Afghan people have experienced these different
systems within their lifetimes. Talking to some of the people in Afghanistan
during my trips there, they have learned a lot of lessons and I think the
international community needs to pay attention to that when they are working
on rule of law programs in Afghanistan.
Another important thing to know about the Afghan legal system is that
there is an informal as well as a formal legal system. In the United States,
when we think of a legal system, we automatically think of courts and
established legal procedure. However, in many areas of the world, the rural
areas do not have the capacity to extend that type of system; there is no
physical infrastructure there. To fill that void, people have developed
institutions such as shuras. Arbitration, as well as other alternative ways to
resolve disputes, has been used in Afghanistan for hundreds of years. They
have worked quickly and effectively for the rural communities for many years.
When constructing a rule of law program or thinking about rule of law issues,
it is important to realize that that is the way the legal system exists. In large
part, the majority of Afghans have more experience with the informal legal
system than they do with the formal system. Thus when international
organizations are trying to create programs, they impose a formal legal system
in an area where it does not fit and where there is no capacity to develop it.
Going back to what the other panelists said, it is important to understand the
situation that you are working with and to ask the people what they need.9 I
have seen so many programs that are designed based on other people's ideas.
It is all done with good intentions, but they never ask the people in that area
what would work for them. I think that is one of the biggest mistakes that can
be made.
Going back to the post-conflict period in Afghanistan after the fall of the
Taliban, there was an agreement in Bonn, Germany.'" Afghan stakeholders got
9 See infra pp. 122, 129-35.
'0 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment
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together at this conference and really set out a framework for how the legal,
political, and constitutional development would take place from 2002 to
2004." The Bonn Agreement is a simple document--only four pages-but it
created some new institutions that have been used the past two years. There
have been some successes and some failures. As it was a short document,
there were a lot of ambiguities. As lawyers, we know that once a document is
in place, it is sometimes hard to figure out the intent or whether a certain issue
was ever thought through to begin with. I think that one of the most important
things that has come out of the Bonn Agreement is that it has set the legal
precedent that is the beginning of establishing the rule of law. One thing that
I have seen that has been a good development is that every time there is a
question of how something should go forward, everyone refers back to the
Bonn Agreement. They do not try to create a new document or new rule. If
it is not in the Bonn Agreement, they look to Afghan law and international law
to resolve the issue.
The Bonn Agreement created several institutions: the judicial reform
commission,' 2 a human rights commission, 3 a constitutional commission," an d
an independent election commission.' These institutions have been used in
Afghanistan since 2001, although they developed differently based on the
support they got from donors, which is one of the things I will talk about in
terms of thejudicial reform commission. They developed at least some sense
of a plan for going forward for these areas.
The Bonn Agreement also authorized the creation of the international
assistance force, ISAF, 6 a four thousand to five thousand-member, multina-
tional force inside Kabul that has been very successful the past two years.
Unfortunately, this has never expanded, and although there was one deploy-
ment sent to a city in the north that did not need it so much, there has not been
a plan that has affected the whole country in terms of providing security. That
has been one of the most important impediments to providing security and
establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan.
of Permanent Government Institutions, Dec. 5, 2001, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/
Afghanistan/paafghia_ 12052001 .html.
Id.
12 Id. pt. 11(2).
"3 Id. pt. III(¢)(6).,
14 Id. pt. 1(6).
13 Id. pt. IV.
16 Id. Annex 1.
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To give you an example, in Bosnia, there was approximately one peace-
keeper for every sixty-five people. " In Afghanistan, that number is about one
to 5300.18 That shows you the disparity; without proper security in areas
outside of Kabul, it has been and continues to be a challenge to establish any
type of rule of law program.
Early in 2002 there was a donor conference in Tokyo. 9 The UN decided
to do things a little differently in Afghanistan than in previous post-conflict
situations where the UN had taken the responsibility of managing the whole
country. When things did not go right, the donor countries blamed the UN
What they did differently was they asked donor countries to become the lead
donor on a certain issue. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States took
the lead on training the new Afghan military; the Germans took the lead on
training the police force; the U.K. took the counter-narcotics area; Italy took
judicial reform; and Japan took demobilization of former militia. This
approach has been interesting and in some areas it has been effective. For
example, Germany has a pretty effective training program for police officers.
They have refurbished and reestablished Kabul's police academy. They have
been working on police training and providing equipment and vehicles. The
United States has also been doing that for already-commissioned officers.
Unfortunately, in other areas, such as judicial reform, certain countries, like
Italy, subcontracted their work out to an international organization and were
not very active in terms of providing leadership. As a result, the judicial
reform commission that they were supposed to assist has not been receiving
the support it needs to come up with any type of strategy or plan. Up until last
year, they did not have one advisor to help on budgeting and technical issues.
On the other hand, the constitutional commission received a lot of
international attention and support. Within a year-and-a-half period, that
process was pretty successful. But throughout that whole process, I kept
thinking, "What's going to happen after a year and a half when you have this
constitution and you don't have any institutions to implement it?" That is the
point where Afghanistan is now. This judicial reform that should have been
a priority from the beginning was not. Thus, in Afghanistan, you have a
" Press Release, CARE, CARE Says Ideal Time to Expand ISAF Mandate in Afghanistan
(Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.careusa.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2003/aug/08112003-
afghanistan.asp/.
See id.
" International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, Tokyo, Japan (Jan.
21-22, 2002), at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle-e/afghanistan/min02Ol/index.html.
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multilateral approach, which is good. The downside is that it can lead to lack
of coordination and uneven development.
In terms of security, the Afghan national army and police are being trained.
But the pace has not been going fast enough to really provide security and that
is why the Afghan people have been asking for the security forces to extend
their presence beyond Kabul.
Opium production is still a problem in terms of establishing the rule of law.
We all know what type of activities a drug trade can cause in a country. It
leads to the financing of terrorist activities and to corruption in the whole
judicial system, so there has to be a good enforcement program. It can only be
done with the help of the international community providing the incentives and
enforcement needed to curb the drug trade. Unfortunately, from 2002 to 2003,
the drug trade doubled in size to half the size of the legal economy."0 That is
another one of the major issues affecting rule of law in Afghanistan.
In terms of the status of the Afghan legal system right now, it is important
to understand the baseline. When you think of a courthouse, something maybe
as beautiful as this, you do not see that in Afghanistan at all. A court could be
a room in some rundown building. Outside of Kabul, there is not much. There
has been some physical reconstruction of the facilities, but it is still not what
we are used to here in the United States in terms of physical infrastructure.
Capacity is another major issue. During the Soviet invasion, a lot of qualified
people left or were executed. So, in that twenty-three year period, people who
had the expertise to serve as judges and lawyers died. At the same time, there
was no training of new people. So, there is a thin layer of capacity in
Afghanistan. You do have some people who have the capacity, but then they
do not receive the necessary support. There has to be a lot of support for
building up a new generation of Afghan lawyers who can serve. They are the
ones who are going to help implement this constitution and defend the people's
rights in the country.
Some law reform programs have been successful. I do not want to seem too
negative and just point out the challenges. A new banking law passed last year
resulted in three new commercial banks in Kabul. A new press law was passed
and 250 independent publications were created. A political party law was
passed as well as a very liberal investment law. In these areas there have been
a lot of successes. But there has been a great divide between these areas of
20 OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNITED NATIONS, AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2003 52
(2003), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistarLopium-survey.2003.pdf.
[Vol. 33:119
THE RULE OF LAW
commercial law and the kind of law that affects people day to day, for
example, criminal law and family law.
In Afghanistan, it is not just the lack of capacity, but also a lack of access
to the law during periods of conflict. When you have different regimes
enacting different laws, it is difficult to know what law applies. The
cataloguing has taken place that Scott was talking about,2 but no one has gone
through the process to determine which laws should apply. That will likely be
one of the huge tasks for this new parliament that will be elected.
You cannot build the rule of law until you know what it is. Unfortunately,
because of this conflict, may of the laws were lost and destroyed. On top of
that, there were several different regimes who came in with different laws.
These are just some of the challenges and they are illustrative of what is
happening in Afghanistan. I think it is important to work, as Professor Brooks
said, with the people in the country, to follow their plan, and to assist them,
rather than coming in with your own predetermined plan and vision of what
you think is good for the country.2 2 Thank you.
21 See infra p. 123.
22 See infra pp. 129-30, 135.
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